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Abstract—An effective way to suppress the cascading failure
risk is the branch capacity upgrade, whose optimal decision
making, however, may incur high computational burden. A
practical way is to find out some critical branches as the
candidates in advance. This paper proposes a simulation data
oriented approach to identify the critical branches with higher
importance in cascading failure propagation. First, a concept
of cascading failure chain (CFC) is introduced and numerous
samples of CFC are generated with an AC power flow based
cascading failure simulator. Then, a directed weighted graph
is constructed, whose edges denotes the severities of branch
interactions. Third, the weighted hypertext-induced topic search
(HITS) algorithm is used to rate and rank this graph’s vertices,
through which the critical branches can be identified accordingly.
Validations on IEEE 118-bus and RTS 96-bus systems show
that the proposed approach can identify critical branches whose
capacity upgrades suppress cascading failure risk more greatly.
Moreover, it is also shown that structural importance of a branch
does not agree with its importance in cascading failure, which
indicates the effectiveness of the proposed approach compared
with structure vulnerabilities based identifying methods.
Index Terms—cascading failure; critical branches; interaction
graph; HITS algorithm
I. INTRODUCTION
MODERN power grid is a complex infrastructure systemwith wide spatial span and huge amount of equipments.
Its security is threatened by many factors such as 1)various
unexpected external disturbances, e.g., the fluctuations of load
and renewable energy [1], the contingencies induced by equip-
ment aging [2] or extreme weather [3], and the recent cyber
attacks [4] [5]; 2)some inherent mechanisms in power grid
that may cause serious dependent outages, e.g., power flow
transfer induced branch overloading. Thus, power grid is prone
to cascading failure and is faced with major blackout risk. In
fact, this has been verified by the massive historical records
of blackouts in the world, e.g., the ones in United States and
Canada on August 17th [6], in Europe on Dec. 4th, 2006 [7],
in Brazil on Feb. 4th, 2011 [8] and in India on Jul. 30th &
31th, 2012 [9]. Thus, modeling, understanding and mitigation
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of cascading failure have drew much attention recently [10].
On the basis of constantly emerging of cascading failure
models, e.g., the branching process models [11] [12], the
ORNL-PSerc-Alaska (OPA) models [13]–[15], transient analy-
sis based models [16] [17] and the multi-timescale models [18]
[19], researchers seek to develop effective countermeasures to
alleviate the threats of cascading failure.
Since the cascaded branch overloading is widely accept as
a major mechanism of cascading failure [20] [21], branch
capacity upgrades (BCU) is viewed as an effective way to
suppress the cascading failure risk (CFR) [22]. Several proba-
bilistic BCU models have been proposed respectively in [23]–
[26] to optimize the upgrade plan (location and size) for the
sake of minimizing the CFR or blackout probabilities. Mathe-
matically, the intractableness of this mixed integer simulation-
optimization problem lies on 1)the time-consuming simulation
in objective function evaluation and 2)the huge feasible region
by mixed integer variables. Although some heuristic methods
have been utilized, e.g., the PSO algorithm [23] [24], the tabu
search [25] and the high throughout computing platform based
pattern search algorithm [26], they may still cause extremely
high computational burdens when being applied in large power
grid. A practical way to address this issue is to reduce the
searching space through choosing some critical branches as the
candidates, which should have higher importance in cascading
failure propagation and thereby whose upgrades can suppress
the CFR more greatly. Thus, how to search for these critical
branches remains an issue worthing exploring.
The concept of critical branches are interpreted from various
viewpoints. For instance, within the application of complex
network theory in power grid, it is assumed that the branches
with higher structural importance are more critical. Accord-
ingly, some indices, e.g., vertices degree, edge betweenness
[27], electrical hybrid flow betweenness [28], and the extended
betweenness [29] [30], are introduced to rate and rank the
branches. However, these approaches emphasize more on the
static structure vulnerabilities of power grid and ignore some
basic characteristics, e.g., the Kirchhoff laws and the impact of
supervision and control scheme of power grid. Thus, the com-
plete agreement between the structure importance of a branch
and its importance in cascading failure can not be guaranteed.
Meanwhile, some other literatures define the critical branches
as the ones whose outages will cause more serious violations in
the remaining part of power grid. Therefore, various searching
approaches have been proposed in the on-line contingency
2analysis scheme such as the performance indices introduced
by Ejebe and Wollenberg [31], the power transfer distribution
factor (PTDF) based method [32], the genetic algorithm based
heuristic method [33] and the electrical distance method [34].
In fact, the branches found by these methods can only be
viewed as the serious initial outages. However, impacts of
possible post-contingency cascading process are not consid-
ered. Thus, the ones that play the exactly important roles in
cascading failure propagation may be missed.
Essentially, cascading failure is a sequence of dependent
outages caused by equipment interactions. Thus, to make
more correct and effective identification, the branch behaviors
during cascading process should be considered reasonably.
Some researchers extract useful information directly from
utilities’ blackout records or from simulation results. Ref. [35]
constructed a synchronization matrix from simulation results
of OPA model to identify the branches with higher overloading
probabilities. Statistics of cascading branch outages spreading
was analysed in [36] using the historical utility records. A
line interaction graph was built in [37] to provide useful
insight into how lines interact with each other. Further, a
series of branch interaction model were proposed in [38] [39],
which can generate similar statistics of branch failures with
the ones by original simulators. Though, these works open a
door to fully investigate the interaction between transmission
branches during cascading failures, further discussions are still
needed, e.g., how to integrally consider both the frequency and
severity of branch interaction. Inspired by the aforementioned
achievements, we have made some works list as follows: 1)We
use a standard structure of cascading failure chain (CFC)
to depict the cascading process. Then, large amount of CFC
samples are generated with an AC power flow based cascading
failure simulator. 2)Based on the stochastic features of CFC,
a directed weighted graph is constructed to quantify the
interactive influences between branches with the consideration
of both their occurrence frequency and severity. 3)The well
known Hypertext-Induced Topic Search (HITS) algorithm is
adopt to rate and rank the vertices of the graph, through
which the critical branches of the original power grid can be
identified equivalently; 4)The strategies of self-validation and
cross-validation are adopt to validate the identification results
of the proposed approach, which is shown to be able to identify
the critical branches whose capacity upgrades can suppress
CFR more greatly. Moreover, it is also verified that structure
vulnerabilities based importance of a branch does not agree
with its importance in cascading failure propagation, which
indicates the effectiveness of the proposed approach as well.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: Section II
lists the conventional structure vulnerability based metrics as
comparison; Section III introduces the specifics of proposed
identification approach and the validating method. Case studies
are presented in Section IV; Section V draws the conclusion
and gives discussions.
II. STRUCTURE VULNERABILITY BASED METRICS TO
IDENTIFY THE CRITICAL BRANCHES
Identifying the critical branches with metric from the per-
spective of structure vulnerability is a hot topic. The metric
betweenness, which stems from the complex network theory,
has been widely used to evaluate the structural importance of
transmission branches in power grid. Moreover, some modified
metrics that combines the node pair concept of betweenness
and electrical characteristics of power grids are proposed, e.g.,
the electrical betweenness and the extended betweenness [28]
[29] [30]. Specifics of these metrics are introduced as follows.
1) Betweenness: Regardless of generators and loads, the
power grid can be abstracted to be an undirected graph,
whose vertices and edges represent the nodes and transmission
branches of power grid respectively. The betweenness of a
edges is proposed as follows,
B1(l) =
∑
i∈N ,j∈N
σij(l)
σij
, l ∈ B (1)
where for any transmission branch (edge) l that belongs to the
branch set B, B1(l) denotes its betweenness, and N stands
for the electrical nodes (vertices) set. For any node pair i-j,
σij is the number of the shortest pathes between i and j, and
σij(l) is the number of the shortest pathes that go through
branch l.
2) Electrical betweenness: The betweenness metric in (1)
is a pure topology based one, which does not consider the
electrical characteristics of power grid, e.g., the power flow
distribution and the interactive relationship between nodes
connected with generators and load. Thus, an electrical be-
tweenness is proposed in shown as follows.
B2(l) =
∑
i∈NG,j∈ND ,i6=j
√
WiWj |Iij(l)| , l ∈ B (2)
where B2(l) denotes the electrical betweenness metric of
branch l,NG is the set of nodes that are connected with gener-
ators, whileND for the set of nodes connected with loads. For
any node pair i-j that i ∈ NG and j ∈ ND, Wi denotes the
maximum or real time output capacity of generators connected
with node i, while Wj denotes the maximum capacity of
loads connected with node j. Iij(l) is the current in branch
l when 1.0 p.u. current is injected into node i meanwhile
1.0 p.u. current is withdrawn from node j. This electrical
betweenness metric considers the influence of generator and
load capacity and power distribution characteristics, and hence
seems to reflect the inherent feature of power grid with a more
comprehensive way compared with the metric in (1).
3) Extended betweenness: To combine the power flow
distribution factors (PTDFs) with topological analysis,
E.Bompard et al. proposed a novel extended betweenness
metric to analyze the structural stability of power grid, which
can be calculated as follows. Assume that each transmission
branch has a designed limit Pmax(l), a pairwise power trans-
mission capacity betweeen generation node i and load node
j when the first branch in the grid reaches its limitation is
defined as
Pij = min
l∈B
(
Pmax(l)
|Fi(l)− Fj(l)|
), i ∈NG, j ∈ND (3)
where Fi(l) and Fj(l) are the power flow on branch l when
a unit power is injected into the generation node i or the load
node j and withdrawn from the slack node, respectively. Then,
3the extended betweenness for a branch l is defined as the
overall power transmitted across branch l in a power grid,
which is formulated as follows.
B3(l) = max{TP (l), TN(l)} (4)
where TP (l) =
∑
i∈NG,j∈ND
max{Fi(l) − Fj(l), 0}Pij and
TN (l) =
∑
i∈NG,j∈ND
|min{Fi(l) − Fj(l), 0}|Pij are the
positive directed and negative directed summated power flow
on branch l with respective to the transmission limit of each
node pair i-j, i.e., Pij , respectively.
All these three metrics are used to quantify the structural
importance of branches. It is believed by the complex net-
work theory that the higher metric values indicate the higher
important role in sustaining the transmission efficiency of
the topological structure. Further comparisons between these
methods with the proposed method is presented in Section IV.
III. CASCADING FAILURE CHAIN STATISTICS BASED
CRITICAL BRANCHES IDENTIFICATION
The main task of this paper is to identify the critical
branches with statistical information extracted from power
grid behaviours in cascading failure process. In what follows,
specifics of the proposed approach are introduced.
A. AC power flow based cascading failure simulation model
Mechanisms of cascading failure are particularly complex,
which makes it hard to model the cascading process with 100%
accuracy. Without loss of generality, we consider two widely
accept mechanisms, i.e., the cascading overloading and hidden
failure of branches, and propose an AC power flow based
simulation model, whose main components are presented here.
1) Selection of initial outages: We specify that the initial
disturbances to trigger the cascading process are the branch
outages, which can be selected in terms of their own indepen-
dent failure probabilities [15] or can be any N-k contingencies,
e.g., N-2 in [16].
2) Selection of sequent outages: It is assumed here that
branches fail due to either overloading or hidden failure. In
particular, when the load flow of branch l, denoted as fl, is
below its long term thermal limit flim1,l, its failure probability,
denoted as pl, is 0. If fl exceeds the short term emergent
thermal limit, denoted as flim2,l, branch l is considered to be
in an emergent situation and should be cut off immediately to
avoid the structural damages, thus, pl equals 1 now. Otherwise,
when fl locates between flim1,l and flim2,l, pl is formulated
as a linear function of fi shown as follows.
pl =


0 fl ≤ flim1,l
fl−flim1,l
flim2,l−flim1,l
flim1,l < fl ≤ flim2,l, ∀l ∈ B
1 fl > flim2,l
(5)
Once occurring, operators should redispatch the system to
eliminate the branch overloading. However, the sagging caused
tree flash and thermal effect caused aging failure may lead
to the unexpected tripping of overloaded branches. Thus, (5)
is a high-level probabilistic model to depict the uncertainties
of the competition between undesigned thermal effect caused
branch tripping and operators’ actions [40]. Accordingly, in
simulations, once obtaining the steady state of power system,
we use (5) to calculate the failure probabilities of branches,
and then determine the sequent outages with random sampling.
Moreover, adjacent branches of the selected ones assumed to
be exposed to hidden failures [41]. The sequent outages by
hidden failure are also randomly selected from the exposed
branches in terms of their own hidden failure probability phi.
3) Topology updating: The topology information will be
updated once some failed branches are removed. Perform the
connectivity checking for the whole power grid. If the network
breaks into several parts, the sub-grids are reserved, within
which cascading failure simulations will still keep going on.
4) Power flow calculation: Post-contingency state is cal-
culated by solving AC power flow model. First, rebalance the
active power deviation with appropriate generator ramping and
load shedding (if needed). Then, an AC power flow model with
multi slack buses is proposed as follows.∑
g∈Gi
(PGg + rgPloss)−
∑
d∈Li
PLd −Re(V˙i
∑
i∈N
Y ∗ij V˙
∗
j ) = 0
(6a)∑
g∈Gi
QGg −
∑
d∈Li
QLd − Im(V˙i
∑
i∈N
Y ∗ij V˙
∗
j ) = 0 (6b)
where PGg and QGg are the active and reactive output of
generator g respectively; PLd and QLd are the the active and
reactive power of load d; for each node i, Y˙i is its voltage, Gi
and Li are sets of generators and loads connected with node
i respectively. Yij the is mutual admittance between node i
and node j. Each generator is assigned an coefficient rg to
share the transmission loss, denoted as Ploss. Netwon-Raphson
method is used to solve this problem. Once the power flow
model does not converge, it is viewed that voltage collapse
occurs, then a load shedding strategy proposed in [42] is used
to obtain a feasible power flow solution.
5) Emergent dispatch: The situation that no branch is
selected in the random selection of sequent outages indicates
that the operators succeed in pulling the power grid back into
a secure state with no violations of the constraints of branch
load flow and nodal voltage amplitude. This emergent dispatch
is modeled as an optimal load shedding shown as follows.
max
kd,PGg ,QGg ,Vi
∑
d∈L
kdPLd (7a)
s.t.
∑
g∈Gi
PGg −
∑
d∈Li
kdPLd −Re(V˙i
∑
i∈N
Y ∗ij V˙
∗
j ) = 0, (7b)
∑
g∈Gi
QGg −
∑
d∈Li
kdQLd − Im(V˙i
∑
i∈N
Y ∗ij V˙
∗
j ) = 0, (7c)
− flim1,l ≤ fl ≤ flim1,l, ∀l ∈ B (7d)
PGg,min ≤ PGg ≤ PGg,max, ∀g ∈ G (7e)
QGg,min ≤ QGg ≤ QGg,max, ∀g ∈ G (7f)
0 ≤ kd ≤ 1, ∀d ∈ L (7g)
Vmin,i ≤ |V˙i| ≤ Vmax,i, ∀i ∈N (7h)
where N , B, G and L denote the sets of nodes, branches,
generators and loads respectively; kd is its shedding ratio that
locates in [0, 1] for load d. Vmin,i and Vmax,i are the lower
4& upper boundaries for the amplitude of V˙i and usually take
the value of 0.9 and 1.1 respectively. The implementation of
emergent dispatch is the end of cascading failure, and the
amount of load shedding can be viewed as the severity metric
by the cascading failures.
Algorithm 1: Pseudocode of Cascading Failure Simulator
1 Initialize: denote pre-contingency operation point as Sys
2 Define buffers S1 and S2 that S1 = {Sys},S2 = ∅
3 Selection of initial outages in Sys
4 repeat
5 Assignment: S2← ∅
6 for ∀ island si ∈ S1 do
7 Power flow calculation for island si
8 Selection of sequent outages for island si
9 if None sequent outage occurs in island si then
10 Emergent dispatch for island si
11 end
12 Topology updating for island si
13 if island si splits then
14 Denote newly generated islands as
g1,g2,· · ·,gn
15 S2← S2
⋃
{g1}
⋃
{g2} · · ·
⋃
{gn}
16 end
17 end
18 Assignment: S1← S2
19 until S1 = ∅;
20 Obtain statistics of cascading failure chains and load loss
6) Simulation process: The initial outages are randomly
selected and then used to trigger the cascading failure simula-
tion to obtain the statistics of load loss. The whole process is
represented by the pseudo code shown in Algorithm 1. Several
tools can be adopt to visualized the risk of cascading failure,
e.g., the load loss distribution [16], the VaR&CVaR indices
[14] and the segmented risk histogram [39].
B. Structure of cascading failure chain and evaluation of
branch interactions
Equipment failures may cause sequential outages due to
some inherent mechanisms, e.g., power flow transfer induced
branch overloading. Thus, the propagation process of cascad-
ing failure can be viewed as a sequence of dependent outages
that successively weakens or degrades the power grid [22].
Accordingly, in this paper the whole process of a complete cas-
cading failure is abstracted as a cascading failure chain (CFC),
in which the massive outage events are grouped into stages
with respect to their sequential orders. Fig. 1 exhibits the typ-
ical structure of a CFC, which unfolds two points that should
be noted when evaluating the branch interactions. First, the
power grid may be split into islands after some branch outages
caused by overloading or rotor instability [6] [7]. Thereafter,
the cascading processes keep propagating within these islands
respectively if appropriate emergent actions are not taken.
Thus, one should verify the cause-effect relationship between
two branches in a CFC when evaluating their interactions. For
instance, in Fig. 1, though branch k fails immediately after
Fig. 1. Structure of cascading failure chain
branch i, there exists no cause-effect relationship between
them since the island where branch k fails does not derive
from branch i outage. However, the similar works in [38]
and [39] do not distinguish this difference and simply assume
that any two branches have cause-effect relationship as far as
they are in adjacent stages, which is not the reality. Second, a
specific dependent branch outage in CFC can be viewed as the
trigger of subsequential cascading process, which may lead to
different consequences finally, e.g., load shedding, returning to
a secure state or collapsing completely. Thus, for the sake of a
more comprehensive evaluation, both the occurring frequency
and the consequence severity of branch interactions should be
considered. However, aiming to construct the equivalent high
level models in terms of outages statistics, the existing works
[37] [38] [39] only count the occurring frequency of branch
interaction. Moreover, it is noted that a CFC can be constructed
through grouping the outages into stages, and the outages data
can be obtained from actual utility records [36] or simulators.
In perticar, for the simulators with time marks, the outages
can be grouped with respect to time closeness [43] [39] [44].
As discussed above, in a CFC indexed with s, branch li
is viewed as the cause of branch lj only if branch li fails
in the previous stage of branch lj and meanwhile they have
cause-effect relationship. Thus, we denote this situation as
σli,lj(s) = 1, and otherwise as σli,lj (s) = 0. In this paper,
the severity of interaction that branch li outage causes branch
lj outage in CFC s is remarked as Mli→lj (s) and evaluated
as follows.
Mli→lj (s) =

k1
e
k2
Losslj
(s)
LT
Nli (s)Nlj (s)
, σli,lj (s) = 1
0, σli,lj (s) = 0
(8)
When σli,lj (s) = 0, branch li outage is not the cause of
branch lj outage, thus Mli→lj (s) takes the value of zero,
while when σli,lj (s) = 1, an exponential utility function based
metric is proposed here in terms of Losslj(s), denoting the
total load loss along the whole subsequential process of branch
lj outage. LT is the total supplied load in the original power
grid. k1 and k2 are the non-negative scaling parameters.Nli(s)
is the total number of branches that fail along with branch li
within the same island and in the same stage (including branch
5li). It is the same with Nlj . It is obvious that under given k1
and k2, Mli→lj (s) is a non-decreasing function of Losslj (s).
When k2 = 0, Mli→lj (s) can be viewed as an occurrence
indicator of the event σli,lj (s) = 1, and thus reflects the
occurring frequency in essences, while when k2 > 0, both
the load loss severity and the occurrence frequency can be
considered. Besides, since there may be multi outages within
the same island in a stage, Nli(s) and Nlj (s) are introduced
to evenly attribute the severity to all involved branches.
Further, if the set of all potential CFSs is denoted as ΩP ,
the total impacts of branch li on branch lj , denoted as Eli→lj ,
can be calculated as follows.
Eli→lj =
∑
s∈ΩP
probli→lj (s)Mli→lj (s) (9)
where probli→lj (s) is the occurring probability of the
event σli,lj(s) = 1 and can be theoretically calculated as
probli→lj (s) = pj(s)
∏
k pk(s) where pk(s) is the conditional
probability of outages in previous stages of branch lj outage
and pj(s) is failure probability of branch lj in CFC s.
However, since ΩP is hard to be exhaustively enumerated,
Eli→lj is estimated through CFC sampling in this paper as
follows.
Eˆli→lj =
1
Ns
Ns∑
s=1
Mli→lj (s) (10)
whereNs is the total number of CFC samples that are obtained
with the cascading failure simulator proposed in this paper.
Finally, a directive weighted graph G can be constructed to
represent the overall interactions between branches. Vertices
of G denote the branches in original power grid, and the
directed edges of G denote the interactive relationship between
branches. Accordingly, G can be represented by the weighted
adjacency matrix W , whose element wij can be determined
as follow.
wij =
{
Eˆli→lj , i 6= j
0, i = j
(11)
C. HITS Algorithm
In this paper, the well-known Hyper-Induced Topic Search
(HITS) algorithm is adopt to rate and rank the vertices of
G, through which the critical branches can be identified
accordingly. HITS algorithm is a link analysis algorithm that
was originally developed in [45] for a search engine to select
the highly relevant web pages for a particular query. As shown
in Fig. 2, the web network can be represented as a directed
graph, whose vertices and edges denote the web pages and the
hyperlink relationships between pages respectively. The main
concepts of HITS algorithm are the the hub, representing a
page that points to many other pages and thus provides more
accesses to the useful pages, and the authority, representing
a page that was pointed by many other hubs and thus has
more information relevant with the query theme. Each node
(web page) i is assigned with two attributes, the hub value,
hubi and the authority value, authi. It is assumed that the
authority value of node i is reinforced by the hub values of
nodes that point to i, and at the same time the hub value
of node i is reinforced by the authority values of the nodes
Fig. 2. Illustration of authority and hub webs
pointed by i. Thus, for the sake of calculating hubi and authi,
iterations can be performed as auth
(k+1)
i =
∑
j:j→i hub
(k)
j ,
hub
(k+1)
i =
∑
j:i→j auth
(k+1)
j , where j : j ⇒ i denotes the
set of nodes that point to i, and the superscript k denotes the
iteration number [45] [46].
However, the aforementioned algorithm is a purely topo-
logical structure oriented one, and does not consider the edge
weights of the network, which may denote the quality of web
linkages, e.g., the occasional failing and the user preference
of the linkages. Therefore, a weighted HITS algorithm was
introduced and theoretically analysed in [47]. We utilize this
revised formulation of HITS algorithm to analyse the branch
interaction graph G built in the last subsection. Specifically,
each vertex i (i.e., branch i) of G is assigned with two
attributes, the impact severities of causing other branches’
failing and being caused by other branches, which can be
viewed as analogies to the concepts of authority and hub
and thus are still denoted as hubi and authi respectively.
Combined with the weighted adjacency matrix W of G, the
updating strategies for hubi and authi are shown as follows.
auth
(k+1)
i =
∑
j:j→i
wji∑
p:j→p wjp
hub
(k)
j (12)
hub
(k+1)
i =
∑
j:i→j
wij∑
p:p→j wpj
auth
(k+1)
j (13)
where hubj is attributed to the vertices pointed by vertex j
with the proportion of edge weights between them, meanwhile
authj is also attributed to the vertices pointing to vertex j
with the same strategy. Since authki and hub
k
i may become
too large in the iteration process, a normalization for them
is imposed at each step. Details of the calculation process are
shown in Algorithm 2. In addition, the convergence of iteration
is guaranteed under the condition that G is strongly connected
[47], thus the zero entries of W can be replaced with a very
small positive real number, which has little influence on the
final results. Finally, a composite metric can be formulated as
follows
Ki =
1
2
(authi + hubi), ∀i ∈ B (14)
where Ki is the importance metric in cascading failure for
branch i, which can comprehensively take into account the
two attributes’ effects. The branches with larger Ki values
6are viewed as having higher importance in propagation of
cascading failures, thus the critical branches can be identified
from the descending order of Ki values.
Algorithm 2: Pseudocode of weighted HITS algorithm
Input : N ×N weighted adjacency matrix W of the
branch interaction graph G
Output: the importance metric for each branch Ki
1 Define N × 1 vectors A(k), H(k), k = 0, 1, 2, · · · ;
2 Entries of A(k) and H(k) are denoted as auth
(k)
i and
hub
(k)
i respectively, 1 ≤ i ≤ N ;
3 Initialization: auth
(0)
i = 1, hub
(0)
i = 1, k = 1
4 repeat
5 for 1 ≤ i ≤ N do
6 auth
(k)
i =
∑
j:j→i
wji∑
p:j→p wjp
hub
(k−1)
j
7 hub
(k)
i =
∑
j:i→j
wij∑
p:p→j wpj
auth
(k)
j
8 end
9 normalize A(k+1) that ‖A(k+1)‖2 = 1;
10 normalize H(k+1) that ‖H(k+1)‖2 = 1;
11 Updating k: k = k + 1
12 until ‖A(k) −A(k−1)‖∞ + ‖H
(k) −H(k−1)‖∞ < ε;
13 Assign: Ki =
1
2 (auth
(k)
i + hub
(k)
i ), 1 ≤ i ≤ N
D. Validation for Identification Results
Due to lacking rigorous analytical models, the identification
results should be validated. A simple but effective branch
capacity expansion model has been used in the vulnerability
analysis of complex network [48] [49], in which the capacity
of a node/branch is set as Ci = αLi,0 where Li,0 is its initial
load and α is the system-wide tolerance coefficient bigger than
1.0. An external attack scheme is viewed more vulnerable if
its severity decreases less when α increases. Similarly, in this
paper we formulate a simple branch capacity upgrade model
as follows
flim1,l = flim1,l +∆C, l ∈ BC (15a)
flim2,l = flim2,l +∆C, l ∈ BC (15b)
where ∆C is the increment of branch capacity, and BC
denotes the set of branches to be upgraded. It is assumed in this
paper that when BC is composed of more critical branches,
the CFR can be suppressed more greatly. Then, two strategies
are adopt to perform the validations [10] as follows:
1) Self-validation: Based on the identification results of
the proposed approach itself, comparisons are made to val-
idate whether upgrading more critical branches will suppress
cascading failure risk more greatly, and so as to validate the
reasonability of the proposed metric Ki to reflect the branch
importance.
2) Cross-validation: Compare identification results of dif-
ferent approaches, e.g., the proposed one and the structure
vulnerabilities based ones, and validate whether upgrading
branches identified by the proposed approach seems more
effective.
Fig. 3. Gephi based visualization of the graph G of IEEE 118 bus system.
The size of a vertex label is proportional to its Ki value (importance of
branch), and the width of a edge is proportional to its weight value wij (i.e.,
interaction severity between branches).
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Fig. 4. Identification results for IEEE 118 bus system, in which (a) shows
the histogram of Ki values across all branches marked from 1 to 186; (b)
shows the distributions of Ki and wij which are normalized with min-max
scaling.
IV. CASE STUDIES AND RESULTS
A. Tests on IEEE 118 bus system
Case studies are performed on the IEEE 118 bus system,
whose data can be accessed from [50]. It has 186 branches and
3733 MW load. To increase the operation stress, each load is
increased by 60%. The values of flim1,l are set to be 140
MW. and 450 MW for transmission lines and transformers
respectively. Vmin,i and Vmax,i take the value of 0.9 and
1.1 respectively for all nodes. The hidden failure probabilities
of branches are all set as 0.01. The initial operation point
7is determined by optimal power flow model. Initial outages
are randomly selected from N-2 branch contingencies [16],
then numerous CFC samples are obtained through simulations.
The iteration number for each simulation is set as 1.0× 105,
Thereafter, critical branches are identified with the proposed
approach, in which the parameters k1 and k2 are set as 6 and 3
respectively. The threshold ε for the weighted HITS algorithm
is 10−5. In result validations, ∆C takes the value of 300MW.
Visualization of the graph G is implemented as shown in
Fig. 3, in which the size of vertex label is proportional to
the corresponding branch’s Ki value, and the edge width is
proportional to wij value of the corresponding branch pair.
It is observed that the severities of most branch interactions
are relatively low, while the strong interactions mainly exist
between only a small part of branches, including branch 37,
41, 119, 108, 116, 121, etc.. Thus, it can be inferred that these
branches are the critical hubs or authorities in the propagation
process of cascading failure. Further, the histogram of Ki
values of all 186 branches are shown in Fig. 4(a). It can
be observed that only one branch has the Ki value that is
bigger than 0.4, and there exist only 13 branches whose Ki
values exceed 0.1. Apart from these high ranking branches,
Ki values of all other branches are below 0.1, moreover even
nearly half of the branches are with Ki values below 0.01.
For a more clear revelation, the distributions of normalized
Ki and wij values are depicted in Fig. 4(b). It shows that
both of these two metrics appear to have the characteristics
of power law distribution, which, in other words, support
the awareness that only a small part of the branches have
much higher importance than others. Thus, based on these
observations, it can be verified that some branches may be
more prone to be affected by other outages or the failures
of themselves are more apt to cause sever sequential outages.
These branches play more important roles out of others in
promoting the propagation of cascading failures, which can
be identified effectively by the proposed approach. In addition,
Fig. 5 shows the convergence characteristics of the proposed
approach. The converging curves of wij , taking w37,22, w22,19
and w41,29 as examples, demonstrate the reliable performances
of both cascading failure simulator and the proposed metric
wij . Meanwhile, as depicted in Fig. 5(b), the iterative error of
the weighted HITS algorithm decreases below the threshold
ε after about 30 iterations, indicating the credibility of the
proposed approach.
To validate the identification results, several comparative
case studies are made here. First, whole 186 branches of
IEEE 118-bus system are ranked in a descending order in
terms of their Ki values, from which three typical groups of
branches are selected and shown in Tab. I, i.e., top ranking
branches, which rank 1st to 12th, middle ranking branches,
which rank 15th to 26th, and bottom ranking branches, which
rank 175th to 186th. As listed in Tab. I, Ki values of these
three groups of branches locate in the ranges [0.1280, 0.4183],
[0.0518, 0.0979] and [1.92× 10−3, 2.57× 10−3] respectively,
which are three typical different importance levels. Mean-
while, as comparison, top 12 branches of the rankings in
terms of betweenness, electrical betweenness and extended
betweenness are respectively listed in Tab. II. Then, based on
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Fig. 5. The converging characteristics of the proposed approach on IEEE 118
bus system. (a) shows the converging curves of some entries of W ; (b) shows
the converging curve of weighted HITS algorithm.
TABLE I
CRITICAL BRANCH IDENTIFICATION RESULTS BY THE PROPOSED
APPROACH FOR IEEE 118-BUS SYSTEM
Rank Branch Ki Rank Branch Ki
1 37(8-30) 0.4183 21 18(13-15) 0.0765
2 116(69-75) 0.3803 22 120(75-77) 0.0710
3 41(23-32) 0.3521 23 36(30-17) 0.0561
4 119(69-77) 0.2976 24 45(19-34) 0.0540
5 108(69-70) 0.2552 25 179(32-113) 0.0524
6 22(16-17) 0.2382 26 9(9-10) 0.0518
7 121(77-78) 0.2118 ... ... ...
8 125(79-80) 0.1922 175 129(82-83) 2.57 × 10−3
9 39(17-31) 0.1793 176 141(89-92) 2.56 × 10−3
10 54(30-38) 0.1727 177 83(51-58) 2.52 × 10−3
11 107(68-69) 0.1425 178 80(56-57) 2.50 × 10−3
12 178(17-113) 0.1280 179 101(62-67) 2.49 × 10−3
... ... ... 180 161(92-102) 2.45 × 10−3
15 38(26-30) 0.0979 181 170(105-107) 2.42 × 10−3
16 12(11-12) 0.0973 182 131(83-85) 2.33 × 10−3
17 33(25-27) 0.0925 183 142(89-92) 2.28 × 10−3
18 19(14-15) 0.0899 184 184(12-117) 2.17 × 10−3
19 8(8-5) 0.0865 185 122(78-79) 2.05 × 10−3
20 48(33-37) 0.0842 186 163(100-103) 1.92 × 10−3
the branch capacity upgrade model in (15), the self-validation
and cross-validation for the identification results are made as
follows.
1) self-validation: We compare the CFR suppression per-
formances when branches to be upgraded are selected from
aforementioned three groups respectively. Specifically, given
the number of branches to be upgraded, which equals
Card(BC), top Card(BC) branches of each branch group are
upgraded respectively according to (15). Then simulations are
performed to calculate the CFR (estimated by the average
expected load loss). Fig. 6(a) shows the changes of CFR
8TABLE II
CRITICAL BRANCH IDENTIFICATION RESULTS BY STRUCTURE
VULNERABILITY BASED METRICS FOR IEEE 118-BUS SYSTEM
Betweenness Electrical Betweenness Extended Betweenness
Rank Branch Rank Branch Rank Branch
1 104(65-68) 1 104(65-68) 1 104(65-68)
2 96(38-65) 2 127(81-80) 2 126(68-81)
3 54(30-38) 3 126(68-81) 3 127(81-80)
4 126(68-81) 4 96(38-65) 4 96(38-65)
5 127(81-80) 5 54(30-38) 5 54(30-38)
6 37(8-30) 6 97(64-65) 6 30(23-24)
7 128(77-82) 7 102(65-66) 7 102(65-66)
8 36(30-17) 8 30(23-24) 8 128(77-82)
9 102(65-66) 9 128(77-82) 9 97(64-65)
10 8(8-5) 10 37(8-30) 10 8(8-5)
11 152(80-98) 11 119(69-77) 11 155(84-100)
12 97(64-65) 12 107(68-69) 12 163(100-103)
... ... ... ... ... ...
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Fig. 6. Results of self-validation on IEEE 118 bus system. (a) shows the
performance comparisons of branch upgrade plans with top-ranking, middle-
ranking and bottom-ranking branches identified by the proposed approach
respectively; (b) shows the interval risk histograms of different upgrading
plans when Card(BC ) = 12.
for all three branch groups when Card(BC) increases from
0 to 12 with a step of 2. CFR of original system is 29.81
MW (Card(BC)=0), and keeps reducing dramatically when
more branches are upgraded (Card(BC)>0) no matter which
group the upgraded branches are selected from. This indicates
that branch capacity upgrade is an effective countermeasure to
suppress CFR. However, its performance varies when branches
with different importance are upgraded. It is observed from
Fig. 6(a) that CFR decreases more greatly when top ranking
branches are selected than other two groups of branches,
meanwhile those bottom ranking branches have the lowest
performance. This observation corresponds to the ranking of
these branches’Ki values that upgrading branches with higher
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Fig. 7. Results of cross-validation on IEEE 118 bus system. (a) shows
the performance comparisons of uprading plans with top-ranking branches
identified by the proposed approach and structure vulnerability based metrics
respectively; (b) shows the interval risk histograms of different upgrading
plans when Card(BC ) = 12.
Ki values seems more effective. Thus, it can be verified that
the proposed metric Ki is reasonable to reflect the branches’
importance in cascading failure propagation. In addition, to
further reveal the effectiveness of upgrading critical branches,
Fig. 6(b) presents the interval risk histograms of a specific
case that Card(BC)=12. It is shown that CFR can be reduced
from 29.81 MW to 6.93 MW by upgrading top 12 branches,
to 16.11 MW by upgrading middle 12 branches and to 22.57
MW by upgrading bottom 12 branches respectively. Moreover,
when top 12 branches are upgraded, risks of all intervals, no
matter small blackouts (load loss< 10%), medium blackouts
(10% <load loss< 30%) or large blackouts (load loss> 30%),
decreases significantly. On the contrary, the risk of small
blackouts does not show any reduction when middle or bottom
12 branches are selected.
2) cross-validation: We compare the CFR suppression per-
formances when branches to be upgraded are selected from
identification results of the proposed approach, betweenness,
electrical betweenness and extended betweenness respectively.
Specifically, given the number of branches to be upgraded,
Card(BC), top Card(BC) branches which are ranked by
different approaches are upgraded respectively. Fig. 7(a) shows
the changes of CFR for all identification approaches when
Card(BC) increases from 0 to 12 with a step of 2. It is ob-
served that for any Card(BC)> 0, upgrading critical branches
ranked by Ki values can reduce CFR more greatly than by
the structure vulnerabilities based indexes. Though, upgrading
critical branches identified by the structure vulnerabilities
based indexes can effectively suppress CFR as well, they still
seem less effective compared with the proposed Ki value.
Thus, like the self-validation, this cross-validation also verifies
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Fig. 8. Index values of the identification results for IEEE RTS96 system, in
which (a) shows the histogram of Ki values across all branches marked from
1 to 120; (b) shows the distributions of Ki and wij which are normalized
with min-max scaling.
the reasonability of the Ki value to reflect branches’ impor-
tance in cascading failure propagation. Fig. 7(b) shows the
interval risk histograms for the case that Card(BC)=12. It is
shown that CFR decreases from 29.81 MW to 6.93 MW byKi
value based identification, to 15.36 MW by betweenness based
identification, to 15.96 MW by electrical betweenness based
identification and to 20.21 MW by extended betweenness
based identification. Further, we can observe that the risk
of large blackouts (load loss> 30%) decreases significantly
when all three structure vulnerabilities based identifications
are utilized, which, however, have little effect on the risks
of small blackouts (load loss< 10%) and medium blackouts
(10% <load loss< 30%).
B. Tests on IEEE three area RTS-96 system
To further validate the proposed approach, case studies are
also performed on the IEEE three area RTS-96 system, whose
parameters can be found in [51]. It has 120 branches and
8550 MW load. To increase the operation stress, each load is
increased by 15%, and the value of flim1,l is reduced to 70%
of the original transmission capacity limit for all branches.
Other parameters and pre-settings of simulation are the same
with the cases on IEEE 118-bus system. The histogram of Ki
values of all 120 branches are shown in Fig. 8(a). It is observed
that the largest Ki value is bigger than 0.5, and there are only
11 branches whose Ki values exceed 0.3. Apart from these
high ranking branches, all others’ Ki values are below 0.1.
Distributions of normalized Ki and wij values are depicted
in Fig. 8(b). Similar to the situation of IEEE 118 bus system,
both these two metrics of RTS79 system are also observed
in power law distributions, which is another support to the
TABLE III
BRANCH RANKING WITH THE PROPOSED APPROACH FOR IEEE RTS96
SYSTEM
Rank Branch Ki Rank Branch Ki
1 11(107-108) 0.5171 21 83(303-324) 0.0623
2 87(307-308) 0.4405 22 82(303-309) 0.0583
3 49(207-208) 0.4188 23 12(108-109) 0.0536
4 23(114-116) 0.1956 24 56(211-213) 0.0535
5 99(314-316) 0.1838 25 7(103-124) 0.0517
6 115(107-203) 0.1699 26 79(301-305) 0.0511
7 17(110-112) 0.1689 ... ... ...
8 93(310-312) 0.1595 109 70(218-221) 4.46× 10−3
9 18(111-113) 0.1501 110 38(121-122) 4.38× 10−3
10 94(311-313) 0.1142 111 71(218-221) 4.27× 10−3
11 86(306-310) 0.1046 112 31(117-122) 4.26× 10−3
12 10(106-110) 0.1021 113 32(118-121) 4.07× 10−3
... ... ... 114 33 (118-121) 3.93× 10−3
15 91(309-312) 0.0882 115 19(111-114) 3.85× 10−3
16 6(103-109) 0.0862 116 109(318-321) 3.71× 10−3
17 48(260-210) 0.0836 117 35(119-120) 3.69× 10−3
18 61(214-216) 0.0835 118 111(319-320) 3.68× 10−3
19 92(310-311) 0.0791 119 80(302-304) 3.66× 10−3
20 16(110-111) 0.0753 120 73(219-220) 3.62× 10−3
TABLE IV
BRANCH RANKING BY STRUCTURE VULNERABILITY BASED METRICS FOR
IEEE RTS96 SYSTEM
Betweenness Electrical Betweenness Extended Betweenness
Rank Branch Rank Branch Rank Branch
1 119(318-223) 1 119(318-223) 1 119(318-223)
2 120(323-325) 2 118(325-121) 2 118(325-121)
3 118(325-121) 3 120(323-325) 3 120(323-325)
4 104(316-317) 4 67(216-219) 4 67(216-219)
5 106(317-318) 5 29(116-119) 5 29(116-119)
6 24(115-116) 6 117(123-217) 6 105(316-319)
7 62(215-216) 7 62(215-216) 7 62(215-216)
8 67(216-219) 8 116(113-215) 8 104(316-317)
9 99(314-316) 9 104(316-317) 9 116(113-215)
10 95(311-314) 10 105(316-319) 10 66(216-217)
11 61(214-216) 11 66(216-217) 11 117(123-217)
12 29(116-119) 12 106(317-318) 12 28(116-117)
... ... ... ... ... ...
awareness that only a small part of the branches have much
higher importance than others.
Procedures of the validation for the identification results are
the same with the cases on IEEE 118 bus system. First, whole
120 branches of IEEE RTS96 system are ranked in a descend-
ing order in terms of their Ki values. Tab. III shows three
typical groups of branches, i.e., top ranking branches, ranking
1st to 12th, middle ranking branches, ranking 15th to 26th,
and bottom ranking branches, ranking 109th to 120th. Ki val-
ues of these three groups locate in the ranges [0.1021, 0.5171],
[0.0511, 0.0882] and [3.62× 10−3, 4.46× 10−3] respectively.
Meanwhile, as comparison, top 12 branches of the rankings
according to betweenness, electrical betweenness and extended
betweenness are respectively shown in Tab. IV. Self-validation
and cross-validation are also made with the same procedures
as in the cases on IEEE 118 bus system.
Fig. 9 and Fig. 10 demonstrate the results of self-validation
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Fig. 9. Results of self-validation on IEEE RTS96 system. (a) shows the
performance comparisons of branch upgrading plans with top-ranking, middle-
ranking and bottom-ranking branches identified by the proposed approach
respectively; (b) shows the interval risk histograms of different upgrading
plans when Card(BC ) = 12.
and cross-validation respectively, from which several obser-
vations can be made. First, as shown in Fig. 9(a), with the
increment of the number of upgraded branches (Card(BC)
increases from 0 to 12), CFR decreases monotonically with
a relatively faster speed if the top ranking branches are
selected, while when middle or bottom ranking branches are
selected, CFR decreases much slower and even fluctuates when
Card(BC) ≥ 8. Thus, this observation validate that it is
reasonable to find out the critical branches by the proposed
Ki value based identification. Further, for a specific case that
Card(BC) = 12, it is seen from Fig. 9(b) that CFR can be
reduced from 66.89 MW (without upgrading) to 19.46 MW
by upgrading top 12 branches, to 52.44 MW by upgrading
middle 12 branches and to 66.80 MW by upgrading bottom
12 branches. The risk of large blackouts (load loss> 30%)
accounts for a large propagation in original CFR, and can be
greatly reduced by upgrading top 12 branches, while upgrading
other two branch groups seems much less effective. Second, it
is found from Fig. 10(b) that upgrading the “critical branches”
identified by the three structure vulnerabilities based metrics
shows little influence on CFR when Card(BC) increases.
Through exploring the interval risk histograms shown in Fig.
10(a), it is acquired that for the case that Card(BC) = 12,
upgrading the “critical branches” identified by betweenness
can reduce CFR to 52.63 MW, within which, however, the
risk of large blackouts (load loss> 30%) does not decreases
that much.
To summary, above self-validations and cross-validations on
two typical benchmarks verify that it is reasonable to measure
the branches’ importance with the proposed Ki value, and the
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Fig. 10. Results of self-validation on IEEE RTS96 system. (a) shows the
performance comparisons of branch upgrading plans with top-ranking, middle-
ranking and bottom-ranking branches identified by the proposed approach
respectively; (b) shows the interval risk histograms of different upgrading
plans when Card(BC ) = 12.
identified critical branches are more preferred candidates in
branch capacity upgrade to suppress CFR.
V. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
This paper has proposed an effective way to identify the
critical branches that have higher importance in cascading
failure propagation. The proposed analytic method for the
statistics of cascading failure chains is a reliable tool to
extract useful information from simulation results. Detailed
validations verify that the critical branches identified with the
approach proposed in this paper are more favorable candidates
for the capacity expansion problem. Thus, our approach can
effectively reduce the computational burden of the decision
making on the capacity upgrading. In the future, we will
extend the research in the integration of the proposed approach
with the optimal capacity expansion model. There are several
works along this direction could be extended, e.g., the cross
validation of the proposed approach with the transient stability
integrated cascading failure simulators, the application in large
power grid with the consideration of slow evolution process,
and the heuristic decision making with the combination of the
proposed approach and the BCU model.
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